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Abstract
We evaluate the effect of the 1932 British General Tariff on the output, labour pro-
ductivity and employment growth of British industries. We provide a new disaggre-
gated data set that matches industry-level Census of Production data with industry-
specific tariff rates to accurately isolate treatment and control groups and estimate 
the effect of the General Tariff using difference-in-difference regressions. We evalu-
ate a two-group comparison, between newly and non-newly protected industries, and 
a three-group comparison, between non-newly protected industries and newly pro-
tected industries further divided into those given a baseline 10% tariff rate and those 
given additional tariffs. In the two-group comparison, we identify a tariff effect that 
is large and statistically significant on output and productivity. In the three-group 
comparison, we show that the positive output and productivity effects of the tar-
iff arise from the additional tariff protection, over and above the 10% level. These 
effects are observed over the periods 1930–1935 and 1930–1948, suggesting both 
short-run and medium-term effects on output and productivity of UK industries pro-
tected by the 1932 General Tariff.
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1 Introduction
In February 1932, the UK imposed the General Tariff. This represented a 10% 
ad valorem tariff for British industries, although some industries received addi-
tional duties, on the recommendation of the Import Duties Advisory Committee 
(IDAC), whilst others were exempt or received protection during the 1920s. To 
evaluate the impacts of this measure, we explore the following questions: were 
the “newly protected” industries covered by the 1932 legislation stimulated by the 
tariff over the cyclical recovery of the 1930s, improving their standing relative to 
the non-newly protected and already protected industries; can we identify short- 
and medium-term effects from the General Tariff?
One of the first quantitative studies to evaluate this effect is Richardson (1967) 
who concluded that “the tariff had little effect on the growth of newly protected 
industries between 1930 and 1935”. This conclusion was based on Richardson’s 
evaluation of the effects of protection on output, employment, labour productivity 
and trade in the newly protected industries of 1932 relative to non-newly pro-
tected industries, comparing the benchmark years 1930 and 1935 using the Cen-
suses of Production data. Having observed that, between 1930 and 1935, the fall 
in imports in newly protected industries was less than the fall in imports of other 
industries, Richardson argues for a non-tariff explanation for the healthy perfor-
mance of the newly protected industries—recovery in the newly protected sector 
was thus seen as reflecting general economic recovery in the 1930s.
A major weakness in Richardson’s analysis is the implicit assumption that the 
newly protected and other industries shared similar initial conditions in 1930. 
There is no attempt to compare the economic performance of the newly protected 
and other industries over a longer period that would allow testing of this assump-
tion. The initial conditions in the 1920s will be unimportant only if industries 
were comparable in economic performance and shared similar characteristics. 
We know this was not the case. We apply a difference-in-difference approach, 
using more information about the economic performance of the two groups of 
industries in the pre-protection period as well as additional control variables to 
account for differences in the characteristics of industries over and above their 
growth profiles.
The difference-in-difference approach builds on Kitson and Solomou (1990) 
who used the data contained in the 1924, 1930 and 1935 Censuses of Produc-
tion to distinguish the inter-period performance of the newly protected industries 
of 1932 relative to other industries, comparing the 1924–1930 and 1930–1935 
periods. Thus, the inter-period difference in performance between 1924–1930 
and 1930–1935 is used to identify the effects of protection on different industries. 
In order to test whether industry growth was stimulated by tariffs, Kitson and 
Solomou (1990) considered the output and productivity growth performance of 
the newly protected industries relative to non-newly protected industries. Output 
growth in the newly protected group of 1932 was stagnant in 1924–1930, whilst 
the non-newly protected sector saw a weighted mean growth of 2.7% per annum. 
However, during 1930–1935 there was a substantial turnaround as the newly 
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protected group grew at 3.8% per annum, whilst the other industries grew at 2.3% 
per annum. Kitson and Solomou (1990, p. 111) reported a number of significance 
tests, suggesting that the improved output and productivity performance of the 
newly protected sector during the 1930s were statistically significant, whilst there 
was no effect on the non-newly protected industries.
Broadberry and Crafts (2011) and Crafts (2012) were the first to estimate differ-
ence-in-difference regressions to evaluate the labour productivity effects of the Gen-
eral Tariff on British industries, introducing two innovations: first, the application of 
the difference-in-difference model adds a formal econometric panel data framework1 
to the tests undertaken by Kitson and Solomou (1990); second, as noted above, the 
IDAC implemented a system of additional duties, in excess of 10% ad valorem, 
allowing us to compare three groups of industries instead of two. Broadberry and 
Crafts chose to compare early protected industries with the newly protected group 
further divided into two subgroups, the baseline group of industries given 0–10% ad 
valorem tariff protection in the 1930s and those industries given additional duties on 
the recommendation of the IDAC.2 The Broadberry and Crafts results suggest that 
whilst the effect of the tariff on productivity growth is estimated to be positive, the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant, negating the results on labour productivity 
identified by Kitson and Solomou.
The current paper evaluates the Broadberry and Crafts results. Two avenues of 
research are pursued: first, we place the Kitson and Solomou’s results within a dif-
ference-in-difference framework using the two-group comparison between the newly 
protected industries and the non-newly protected industries; secondly, we make the 
Kitson and Solomou’s data set comparable to Broadberry and Crafts by distinguish-
ing the additional duties from the baseline 10% protected industries. In construct-
ing our data set, we identified two substantive problems with the Broadberry and 
Crafts’s study. First, as noted above, there are problems with the implementation 
of the difference-in-difference method, which mean that the treatment and control 
groups have not been clearly distinguished. Second, a reading of the tariff regula-
tions of the period, and the decisions on additional duties, has highlighted a sig-
nificant number of classification differences with Broadberry and Crafts that affect 
evaluation of the General Tariff. We provide a detailed description of a new data set 
of the tariff protection received by each of the industries in our sample drawing upon 
contemporary tariff information from a variety of sources, including IDAC (1932a, 
b), CET (1935), NIESR (1943), Hutchinson (1965) and various HMRC reports. We 
present the detailed tariff classification and list of sources in Appendix A of Supple-
mentary material to this paper as a resource for future research.
Our paper provides valuable micro-level evidence on the effects of tariffs on 
UK manufacturing industries in the interwar period. We find that manufacturing 
1 The difference-in-difference model is now part of the standard econometrics toolkit. We provide a brief 
outline of the model in the Supplementary material.
2 The 0–10% group is a hybrid group of newly protected (treated) and non-protected (control) industries. 
This grouping does not fit well in the difference-in-difference model—this is discussed further below and 
in the Supplementary material.
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industries who were protected by the General Tariff benefited in the 1930s relative 
to non-newly protected industries. Our results complement recent work by De Bro-
mhead et al. (2017), who find that UK tariffs led to reduced multilateral trade in the 
1930s, with a shift towards imperial imports.
Although our micro-level evidence is focused on partial equilibrium tariff effects 
for UK manufacturing industries and does not provide direct evidence regarding 
the macroeconomic effects of the tariff, our work is related to the broader literature 
studying the relationship between tariffs and growth from a macroeconomic per-
spective where diametrically opposing views on the effectiveness of trade policies 
are common—from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.3 Economic theory 
is ambiguous about the relationship between trade policy and growth. On the one 
hand, tariffs can harm growth by increasing import prices, curtailing competition 
and preventing the exploitation of comparative advantage. On the other hand, tem-
porary tariff protection can potentially benefit infant industries (Williamson 1990) 
and boost growth by aiding the discovery of dynamic comparative advantages (Rod-
ríguez and Rodrik 2000).
Similar divergence exists in the conclusions of empirical research. For exam-
ple, O’Rourke (2000) finds a significantly positive correlation between tariffs and 
growth in the late nineteenth century for a panel of ten countries. Using data for 22 
countries over the period 1920–1940, Vamvakidis (2002) concludes that, controlling 
for other determinants of economic growth, tariffs provided a positive and statisti-
cally significant growth effect. Clemens and Williamson (2004) studied the interwar 
period within the context of the “tariff–growth paradox”. They found that in the pre-
1914 period, tariffs were positively related to economic growth, in contrast to the 
post-WWII period where much of the evidence points to a negative relationship. The 
interwar period is then viewed as a transition period between the two regimes. Using 
a panel study of 35 countries over the period 1919–1938, they find there is no evi-
dence of a statistically significant negative relationship. Focusing specifically on the 
1930s, they find that the four core economies—Britain, France, Germany and the 
USA—benefited from significant positive tariff effects during the cyclical recovery 
period after 1932. In contrast, using a panel data set of 16 OECD countries, Madsen 
(2009) tests the relationship between trade openness (using tariff rates as a proxy 
variable) and economic growth, reporting a significant negative effect from tariffs on 
economic growth in the interwar period. The differing results suggest the presence 
of significant heterogeneity across countries and over time. We seek to add value to 
this debate by clarifying the evidence at the national level using micro-level data for 
UK manufacturing industries during the interwar period.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our updated 
and extended industry-level classification of tariff rates in the 1930s. Section 3 pre-
sents the empirical strategy and results. Section 4 concludes.
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2  Industry Tariff classification
The General Tariff imposed a 10% ad valorem tariff rate for British industries, 
although some industries were exempt (such as some food products and paper) and a 
number of industries were already protected in the 1920s. The legislation also estab-
lished the Import Duties Advisory Committee (IDAC) with the powers of recom-
mending additional duties for industries making a case in the national interest. This 
meant that the average tariff rate gradually moved towards the 20% level.4
The General Tariff set out to protect most industries that were not already pro-
tected by earlier legislation. These formed the bulk of UK industries, including 
most textiles, clothing, iron and steel, the engineering trades and non-ferrous met-
als. Appendix A of Supplementary material shows that the early protected sectors 
were mainly covered by the McKenna Duties (1915) and the Safeguarding of Indus-
tries Act (1921). Most early protected industries were new industries, such as motor, 
cycle and chemicals, and formed a relatively small share of the industrial sector as 
a whole. However, the early protected industries were not all new industries. For 
example, the Silk Duties (1925) were imposed on silk and artificial silk for revenue 
purposes and a customs duty was imposed on hydrocarbon oils (1928).
Leak (1937) shows that by 1934 only 28.1% of imports were subject to the 10% 
tariff rate; most industries were given additional duties, with the modal duty being 
20%. Hence, the IDAC played a key role in determining UK trade policy in the 
1930s. The Committee’s terms of reference were to balance national interest with 
that of the interests of consumers and producers. The Committee saw its aim as 
implementing a “scientific tariff” to achieve this balance. In a study of the decision-
making process of the IDAC, Mitchell (2005) shows that in proposing additional 
tariffs the IDAC considered a range of factors, including the level of import pen-
etration, the level of efficiency in the industry, infant industry aspects, anti-dumping 
responses, employment effects and regional location. Importantly for our identifica-
tion, Mitchell (2005) concludes that business had a limited ability to influence the 
setting of additional tariffs via the IDAC. In part, this was because business lobbies 
were poorly organised and unable to put forward a coherent case before the Com-
mittee.5 In addition, Mitchell (2005) notes that the IDAC worked to strict guidelines 
for the eligibility for additional tariffs. If the Committee were not convinced the 
criteria for additional tariffs were met, businesses could do little to convince them 
otherwise, and “the Committee rebuffed persistent claims” (Mitchell 2005, p. 36). 
Reflecting this, there was no clear relationship between industry concentration and 
tariff protection (Capie 1983). Industries with the most market power were not nec-
essarily able to attain the highest rents associated with additional tariffs.
4 Although non-tariff barriers, such as quotas, were being used fairly extensively by some countries dur-
ing the 1930s, this was not a major feature of UK trade policy. The evidence suggests that the use of quo-
tas was most extensive in the gold bloc economies (Irwin 2012). De Bromhead et al. (2017) show that 
many of the UK Quotas impacted on agricultural goods.
5 Mitchell (2005) notes a handful of exceptions to this, such as the association representing the Iron and 
Steel industry.
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Here, we evaluate the broader statistical evidence on the outcomes of these poli-
cies on industry output, productivity and employment. To do this, we use indus-
try-level data from the 1924, 1930 and 1935 Censuses of Production, considering 
growth rates across two time periods (1924–1930 and 1930–1935).6 We also use 
the data from the 1948 Census of Production to build a picture of the medium-term 
effects of the General Tariff by comparing the 1924–1930 and 1930–1948 peri-
ods. We classify the industries into three groups based on the tariff protection they 
received. The control group of non-newly protected industries is not exposed to the 
General Tariff in either time period. The second and third groups include newly pro-
tected industries, subject to the treatment—the 1932 General Tariff—in the second 
time period, but not the first. The newly protected industries are divided into: (1) 
industries protected at the 10% ad valorem rate and (2) industries with additional 
rates of protection in excess of 10%. To attain accurate estimates of the difference-
in-difference coefficients, it is important that industries are correctly assigned to the 
“true” treatment and control groups. Misspecification of these groups will create 
bias in the OLS estimates.
There are three key refinements to our classification relative to Broadberry and 
Crafts (2011). First, by using all the data from the Censuses of Production, we have 
increased the number of industries in our sample by 19, from 90 in Broadberry and 
Crafts to 109 in this study. Secondly, Broadberry and Crafts have misclassified the 
tariff rates on a number of industries (for example, jute, bottling, seed crushing, 
leather tanning, leather goods, paper, fancy goods and building materials). Finally, 
the 0–10% classification group used by Broadberry and Crafts needs to be corrected 
to separate out the unprotected industries, which faced zero tariff protection (con-
trol), from industries protected at the 10% rate (treatment). The 0–10% group in 
Broadberry and Crafts includes 33 industries (out of their 90 industries), one-third 
of which should be classified as non-newly protected, potentially creating a signifi-
cant bias in the identification of treatment and control groups.
3  Empirical results
3.1  Two‑group classification
We follow Broadberry and Crafts (2011) in using the difference-in-difference meth-
odology to evaluate the effects of the General Tariff. We first estimate the impact of 
the 1932 General Tariff using a two-group classification of industries and data for 
two time periods (1924–1930 and 1930–1935). This represents an extension of the 
Kitson and Solomou (1990) methodology to a difference-in-difference regression 
framework. All regressions are estimated using OLS, and robust standard errors are 
reported. As explained above, the control group includes the non-newly protected 
6 The two time periods (1924–1930 and 1930–1935) are used because of data availability. The Censuses 
of Production, our source of industry-level data, were carried out in 1924, 1930 and 1935 only. Kitson 
and Solomou (1990) and Broadberry and Crafts (2011) use data for the same two time periods.
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industries, a group which includes both industries that were protected early in the 
1920s and industries that did not receive protection in the interwar period.7 There 
are no industries in our sample that received protection prior to the 1932 General 
Tariff, but not after. For the two-group classification, the treatment group includes 
newly protected industries and does not distinguish between industries protected at 
the 10% rate or those with additional duties. By controlling for differences between 
the control and treatment groups before the policy change, the difference-in-differ-
ence regressions directly address the problems with Richardson’s (1967) analysis.
The two-group difference-in-difference model is given by the following equation:
where i = 1, 2,… ,N is an index denoting the N industries in our sample and t = 1, 2 
is an index denoting the two time periods, 1924–1930 and 1930–1935, respectively. 
The dependent variable Δyi,t represents the annualised growth rate of real net output, 
productivity—measured as real net output per worker—or employment for industry 
i during time period t . The time-invariant explanatory variable newproi is a dummy 
variable set equal to unity if industry i was newly protected, and zero otherwise. The 
industry-invariant explanatory variable y35t is a time dummy variable set equal to 
unity for observations in the second time period, 1930–1935, and zero otherwise.
Given these definitions, the parameters in the above equation have the follow-
ing meaning. The intercept 0 captures the average annual output, productivity or 
employment growth of non-newly protected industries in 1924–1930. The time 
dummy coefficient 1 captures the average additional annual output, productivity or 
employment growth for non-newly protected industries in 1930–1935 in excess of 
their 1924–1930 growth. Therefore, the sum of 0 and 1 equals the total average 
annual output, productivity or employment growth for non-newly protected indus-
tries between 1930 and 1935. Similarly, the sum of 0 and  is equal to the average 
annual output, productivity or employment growth for newly protected industries 
in 1924–1930, such that  captures the differential growth rates of newly and non-
newly protected industries over the first time period.
The difference-in-difference coefficient  is of principal interest, measuring the 
average increase in annual real output, productivity or employment growth from 
1924–1930 to 1930–1935 for the newly protected industries conditional on the 
change in growth for the non-newly protected industries. The inclusion of the time 
dummy y35t controls for time fixed effects—factors that are constant across indus-
tries, but vary across time, such as the prevailing macroeconomic environment—
and the inclusion of the industry dummy newproi accounts for industry-group fixed 
effects—factors that are constant over time, but specific to each group of industries, 
such as pre-tariff initial conditions for industry groups. Therefore, the difference-
in-difference estimator captures the treatment effect of the tariff on newly protected 





7 At this stage, it should be noted that heterogeneity in our control group (i.e. including unprotected and 
early protected industries) poses a potential problem for the application of the difference-in-difference 
methodology. In Appendix B.5 of the Supplementary material, we explore the sensitivity of our results to 
this assumption and find that the results are robust in this dimension.
48 S. P. Lloyd, S. Solomou 
1 3
industries: the increase in annual output, productivity or employment growth for 
newly protected industries once the average growth increase in non-newly protected 
industries over the same period has been accounted for. This expression formalises 
this:
where E represents the (conditional) expectations operator.
Figures 1 and 2 graphically illustrate the logic underlying the difference-in-differ-
ence methodology using the tariff classification details in Sect. 2 and Appendix A of 
Supplementary material.8 The plots present industry-by-industry annual growth rates 
of (net) output and labour productivity, respectively. In both figures, the horizontal 
axis plots the average annual growth rate of the variable of interest in 1924–1930, 
whilst the vertical axis plots the average annual growth rate in 1930–1935. The solid 
line depicts the 45° ray of constant industry growth rates in the two periods. Obser-
vations that lie above the 45° ray indicate that an industry grew faster in 1930–1935 
period than in the first, and vice versa for observations that lie below. In Fig. 1, plot-
ting annual output growth, the proportion of newly protected industries (indicated 
by a red cross) lying above the 45° ray clearly exceeds the proportion lying below. 
That is, the number of newly protected industries that experienced faster annual out-



















Δyi,t|newproi = 0, y35t = 0
])
Fig. 1  Output growth across industries, 1924–1930 and 1930–1935. Note Plot of industry-by-industry 
annual net output growth in the two periods—1924–1930 (horizontal axis) and 1930–1935 (vertical 
axis). The groups are formed using the two-group classification detailed in Appendix A of Supplemen-
tary material
8 Corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B.1 of the Supplementary material.
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1924 and 1930. In contrast, growth of non-newly protected industries (indicated by 
a blue circle) is more diverse, with many industries both above and below the 45° 
ray. That is, relative to the non-newly protected control group, a greater proportion 
of newly protected treated industries grew faster in the period in which they received 
the treatment. Figure  2 presents the comparable industry-by-industry productivity 
growth figures for the same two-group classification. Although the patterns are not 
as stark as in Fig. 1, both figures provide illustrative evidence that the General Tar-
iff may have had expansionary effects on treated industries during the 1930–1935 
period, a result that is confirmed by the difference-in-difference regression results.
Table 1 reports formal econometric results for average annual real output, pro-
ductivity and employment growth using the two-group classification, confirming 
the visual inspection of Figs. 1 and 2. In column (1), we estimate that the average 
annual output growth for non-newly protected industries in 1930–1935 was not sig-
nificantly different to 1924–1930. The results highlight the importance of account-
ing for initial conditions; we find that between 1924 and 1930 the average annual 
output growth for newly protected industries was 2.82 percentage points lower than 
for the non-newly protected industries over the same period, significant at the 5% 
level. Notably, the difference-in-difference coefficient indicates that the tariff had an 
expansionary treatment effect of 4.07 percentage points per annum on treated indus-
tries, significant at the 5% level. The size of this treatment effect more than offset the 
output growth shortfall of newly protected industries in 1924–1930.
In column (2), we estimate that the tariff also had an expansionary effect on the 
labour productivity growth of newly protected industries. In 1924–1930, the produc-
tivity of non-newly protected industries grew a 3.01% per annum, a figure that did 
Fig. 2  Productivity growth across industries, 1924–1930 and 1930–1935. Note Plot of industry-by-indus-
try annual net output per worker growth in the two periods—1924–1930 (horizontal axis) and 1930–
1935 (vertical axis). The groups are formed using the two-group classification detailed in Appendix A of 
Supplementary material
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not significantly change in 1930–1935. Productivity growth of the newly protected 
industries was 1.46 percentage points per annum less than their non-newly pro-
tected counterparts in 1924–1930. The difference-in-difference coefficient indicates 
that, between 1930 and 1935, the tariff had an expansionary impact on productivity 
growth of 2.16 percentage points per annum, more than reversing the relative produc-
tivity growth shortfall in the earlier period, significant at the 10% significance level.
In column (3), we estimate the two-group classification with annual employment 
growth as the dependent variable. We do not find that the General Tariff had a significant 
treatment effect on the employment growth of newly protected industries in 1930–1935.
Taken together, the differing significance of treatment effects for productivity 
and employment growth identified in columns (2) and (3) indicates that the net out-
put of newly protected industries predominantly increased because of productivity 
improvements rather than shifts in employment demand/supply.
3.2  Three‑group classification
The three-group classification allows for a more detailed examination of the effects 
of differing tariff protection rates. As in the two-group analysis, our control group 
includes industries that were both early protected and zero-protected.9 For our base-
line three-group classification, we separate the newly protected industries into two 
treated subgroups: (1) newly protected industries at the 10% ad valorem rate and (2) 
Table 1  Difference-in-difference results for the two-group classification
Estimated regression results for the two-group classification. In column (1), the dependent variable is 
annualised average (real) net output growth (in annualised percentage points). The corresponding 
dependent variables in columns (2) and (3) are annualised average net output per worker growth and 
employment growth, respectively. All regressions are estimated by OLS and robust standard errors are 


































Observations 218 218 218
R2 0.098 0.057 0.042
9 We show that our results are robust when the control group is varied to contain only unprotected indus-
tries and only early protected industries in turn in Appendix B.5 of the Supplementary material.
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newly protected industries with tariffs at additional rates in excess of 10% ad valo-
rem. The three-group model can be specified as:
where the two time periods, the dependent variable Δyi,t and the time dummy y35t , 
are defined analogously to the two-group classification. The time-invariant explana-
tory variables teni and addi are dummy variables set equal to unity if industry i was 
newly protected at the 10% rate or at an additional rate, respectively (and zero other-
wise). Thus, the coefficients ten and add are the difference-in-difference estimators 
for the 10% and additionally protected industries, respectively, representing the aver-
age effect of the tariff on each subgroup of newly protected industries relative to all 
non-newly protected industries. The parameters are defined as:
Like Figs. 1 and 2 for the two-group classification, Figs. 3 and 4 visually illustrate 
the logic of our three-group classification.10 In Fig. 3, plotting annual output growth, 
the proportion of newly protected industries, both at the 10% rate (indicated by a 















































Δyi,t|teni = 0, addi = 0, y35t = 0
])
Fig. 3  Output growth across industries, 1924–1930 and 1930–1935. Note Plot of industry-by-industry 
annual net output growth in the two periods—1924–1930 (horizontal axis) and 1930–1935 (vertical 
axis). The groups—non-newly, 10% and additionally protected—are formed using the three-group clas-
sification detailed in Appendix A of Supplementary material
10 Corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix B.1 of the Supplementary material.
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red cross) and additional rates (indicated by a green square), lying above the 45° ray 
clearly exceeds the proportion lying below. That is, the number of newly protected 
industries that experienced faster annual output growth between 1930 and 1935, the 
period in which they received the tariff treatment, exceeds the number that grew 
faster between 1924 and 1930. In contrast, the growth of non-newly protected indus-
tries (indicated by a blue circle) is more varied, with numerous observations above 
and below the 45° ray.
Figure 4 presents the comparable productivity growth figures for the three-group 
classification. Again, a large fraction of newly protected industries—especially those 
protected with additional rates—lie above the 45° ray, indicating that the General 
Tariff had expansionary effects on treated industries during the 1930–1935 period.11
The regression results, reported in Table  2, confirm the insights from visual 
inspection of Figs. 3 and 4 for the three-group classification. Panels A, B and C pre-
sent the results for the regressions with real output growth, productivity growth and 
employment growth as the dependent variables, respectively. The baseline results 
for the three-group classification are in column (1) of each panel. Columns (2)–(5) 
report regression results with additional control variables included to account for 
Fig. 4  Productivity growth across industries, 1924–1930 and 1930–1935. Note Plot of industry-by-indus-
try annual net output per worker growth in the two periods—1924–1930 (horizontal axis) and 1930–
1935 (vertical axis). The groups—non-newly, 10% and additionally protected—are formed using the 
three-group classification detailed in Appendix A of Supplementary material of this paper
11 In Figs. 3 and 4, we label “Sugar and Glucose” to emphasise that they may potentially act as outliers 
in our econometric setup. We present formal analysis in Appendix B.7 of Supplementary material to 
reflect this. Importantly, our headline results are robust to the removal of Sugar and Glucose from our 
sample. Appendix B.8 of Supplementary material also shows that our headline results are robust to the 
weighting of industries by their size.
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potential differences in industry characteristics over and above their interwar growth 
profile. (These controls are explained further below and in Appendix B.2 of Supple-
mentary material.)12
In column (1), we find that average real output growth for non-newly protected 
industries was 4.22% in 1924–1930. This figure did not change significantly in 
1930–1935. In 1924–1930, industries that received a 10% tariff rate in 1932 grew 
more slowly than non-newly protected industries, by 1.56 percentage points per 
annum. The tariff did have a positive effect on these industries (2.27 percentage 
points per annum), but both these effects are statistically insignificant. In contrast, 
the output effect of the tariff on additionally protected industries is statistically sig-
nificant and positive. In particular, the additionally protected industries grew at 3.07 
percentage points per annum less than non-newly protected industries in 1924–1930. 
This growth loss is more than reversed in 1930–1935, as the relevant difference-in-
difference coefficient indicated that the treatment effects of the tariff on these indus-
tries were 4.42 percentage points per annum, significant at the 5% level.
We also find that the tariff had a positive treatment effect on the productivity of 
additionally protected industries in 1930–1935, significant at the 10% level. The 
productivity of additionally protected industries grew at 1.67 percentage points per 
annum less than non-newly protected industries in 1924–1930, a growth loss that is 
more than reversed in 1930–1935. The treatment effect for 1930–1935 is estimated 
to be 2.55 percentage points per annum for additionally protected industries, relative 
to non-newly protected industries. For comparison, using their classification, Broad-
berry and Crafts (2011) estimate that additionally protected industries growth was 
2.3 percentage points per annum higher than the growth of early protected indus-
tries, although their estimate is statistically insignificant. The tariff effect on the pro-
ductivity of 10% protected industries is positive, but not statistically significant.
As with the two-group classification, we find that the tariff did not have a sig-
nificant effect on the employment growth rates of either the 10% or additional rate 
industries. As in the two-group classification, this indicates that the tariff predomi-
nantly boosted the output of UK manufacturing industries through productivity 
improvements, rather than through labour market mechanisms.
In columns (2)–(5) of Table  2, we report the results with additional controls 
included in the regression. These controls are intended to capture otherwise unob-
served features of industries that may simultaneously be correlated with the tariff 
treatment and their output, productivity or employment growth. That is, they are 
intended to capture industry features that may have caused differential changes in 
growth rates across industry groups absent the General Tariff, which, if unaccounted 
for, might bias estimates of the difference-in-difference coefficients.
Because data constraints limit the possible control variables, all controls are time 
invariant and are included in the regression alongside an interaction with the time 
dummy y35t . When augmented with additional industry-specific control variables 
Xi , the regression framework has the following form:
12 We present similar robustness exercises for the two-group classification in Appendix B.3 of the Sup-
plementary material.
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The regression results with control variables included serve to reinforce our 
main conclusion: industries that received additional protection under the 1932 
General Tariff received a significant output and productivity benefit relative to the 
control group.
In column (2), we report the regression results with a set of control variables for 
the 13 different sectors as defined by the Census of Production. That is, we have a 
dummy variable for each sector of the economy that is set to unity if that industry is 
classed within that sector according to the Census of Production, and zero otherwise. 
To the extent that industries within the same sector may co-move, but differ from 
other sectors, or be subject to similar tariff protection within sectors, this control vari-
able can capture time-varying, industry-specific influences, as well as potential non-
random tariff assignment. Column (2) illustrates that the tariff effects for additionally 
protected industries for net output growth and net output per worker growth are robust 
to the inclusion of controls for industry-sector groups. The Census of Production sec-
tor dummies capture limited sectoral heterogeneity. There may still be heterogeneity 
of industries within each sector which could better be accounted for. In column (3), 
we report the results using a more disaggregated classification from Barna (1952) 
with 29 sectors. The results in column (3) indicate that the tariff effects for addition-
ally protected industries are robust to these time-varying controls.
In addition to sector dummies, columns (4) and (5) present regression results 
with additional control variables to account for specific features of industries, 
which may simultaneously be correlated with the growth of an industry as well 
as the tariff protection they received. In column (4), we use control variables 
from Kitson and Solomou (1990), which classify industries as resource inten-
sive, labour intensive, scale intensive, an industry with differentiated products, 
or a food, drink and tobacco industry. Similarly, in column (5), we define control 
variables for industries that were more or less intensively using electricity as an 
input to production. Importantly, the headline results are robust to the inclusion 
of these control variables. Again, these control variables are intended to capture 
industry features that may have led to differences in their evolution absent the 
General Tariff.
Additionally, Appendix B.7 of Supplementary material presents a robustness 
exercise which accounts for industries whose output and employment growth over 
the 1924–1935 period could be considered as potential outliers. These robustness 
regressions can be interpreted as difference-in-difference regressions with a larger 
“region of common support” between treatment and control variables (Ravallion 
2008). Importantly, our headline results are robust to the omission of outliers.
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3.3  Medium‑Term Effects of the General Tariff
The previous results suggest a positive short-term output and productivity effect 
arising from the General Tariff during the period 1930–1935. Extending the Cen-
sus of Production data to include the 1948 Census allows us to investigate whether 
the expansionary effects of the tariff persisted over time. To investigate the medium-
term time profile of the effect, we combine industry-level output and employment 
data from the 1948 Census of Production, with our existing data from the 1924, 1930 
and 1935 censuses. Of the 109 industries in our baseline sample for the 1924–1935 
period, 103 remain in the 1948 sample.13 We estimate the effect of the tariff using 
the three-group classification, redefining the second period in the sample as the 
1930–1948 period (instead of 1930–1935). The dependent variables remain the aver-
age annual growth of real output, productivity and employment over each period.
Table  3 indicates that the 1932 General Tariff had medium-term expansion-
ary effects for additionally protected industries.14 Column (1) illustrates that the 
tariff treatment effect for the output growth of additionally protected industries 
was 3.12% per annum, a result that is significant at the 5% significance level. The 
Table 3  Difference-in-difference results for the three-group classification for 1924–1930 and 1930–1948
Estimated regression results for the three-group classification. In column (1), the dependent variable 
is annualised average (real) net output growth. The corresponding dependent variables in columns (2) 
and (3) are annualised average net output per worker growth and employment growth, respectively. All 

















































Observations 206 206 206
R2 0.060 0.065 0.044
13 The descriptive statistics for the period 1930–1948 are provided in Appendix B.1 of the Supplemen-
tary material, where the distribution of industries across tariff groups is also provided.
14 We report robustness exercises for this regression in Appendix B.4 of the Supplementary material, 
showing that this result is robust to the inclusion of controls.
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corresponding treatment effect of productivity of 1.84% per annum, in column 
(2), is also significant at the 5% level. As expected, the magnitude of these effects 
is slightly smaller than the short-term effects reported in Table 2, but they remain 
large and significant.
4  Conclusions
The application of the difference-in-difference model to the analysis of the policy 
impact of the General Tariff on British industry has provided new insights. Refin-
ing the tariff classification into three groups adds value to the analysis of UK tar-
iffs during the 1930s, allowing us to distinguish between the 10% tariff rate and 
additional tariff rates. This three-group comparison clearly suggests that the treat-
ment effect of the General Tariff was large and statistically significant only for the 
additionally protected industries. This effect is identified over the short run when 
we consider the inter-period comparisons between 1924–1930 and 1930–1935, 
but a similar effect is also identified over the medium term when we consider the 
inter-period comparisons between 1924–1930 and 1930–1948. The Import Duties 
Advisory Committee (IDAC) viewed additional tariff rates as a mechanism for 
helping industries to restructure to help them compete during the 1930s. The pos-
itive output and productivity effects that we identify suggest that they were effec-
tive in achieving some of their aims.
The results reported in this study show that tariffs can have positive effects 
under specific circumstances. This UK-interwar case study should be viewed 
against the backdrop of a global depression, a unique British position of unilat-
eral free trade and a tariff policy that targeted particular industries via the role of 
the IDAC. Using industry-level data, we identify that some benefits for the rela-
tive output and productivity growth of newly protected industries did arise under 
these specific circumstances. Given that the newly protected sector formed a very 
large proportion of the UK industrial output, this is likely to result in positive 
effects on the UK industrial sector.
This study has used disaggregated-level data to analyse the effects of tariffs on 
British industries during the 1930s. Although there have been attempts to relate 
industry-level tariffs and economic growth at the aggregate level, such results 
cannot be mechanically applied to the interwar period. For example, Lehmann 
and O’Rourke (2011) used a panel data set for 10 countries over the period 
1870–1914 and found a positive relationship between industry tariffs and eco-
nomic growth; however, they also argue that this relationship is likely to change 
over time.
Acknowledgements We thank the editor and anonymous referees for useful comments. The majority of 
this paper was written whilst Lloyd was a member of Gonville & Caius College, University of Cam-
bridge. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Bank of 
England or its Committees.
59
1 3
The impact of the 1932 General Tariff: a…
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Barna T (1952) The interdependence of the British Economy. J R Stat Soc Ser A (Gen) 115(1):29–77
Broadberry SN, Crafts NFR (2011) “Openness, protectionism and Britain’s productivity perfor-
mance over the long-run. In: Wood GE, Mills T, Crafts N (eds) Monetary and banking history: 
essays in honour of Forrest Capie. Routledge, Abingdon
Capie F (1983) Depression and protectionism: Britain between the wars. Allen & Unwin, Boston
Clemens MA, Williamson JG (2004) Why did the Tariff-growth correlation change after 1950? J 
Econ Growth 9(1):5–46
Crafts NFR (2012) British relative economic decline revisited: the role of competition. Explor Econ 
Hist 49(1):17–29
De Bromhead A, Fernihough A, Lampe M, O’Rourke KH (2017) When Britain turned inward: pro-
tection and the shift towards Empire in interwar Britain. Working Paper No. 23164, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Forthcoming American Economic Review
Irwin DA (2012) Trade policy disaster: lessons from the 1930s. MIT Press, Cambridge
Kitson M, Solomou SN (1990) Protectionism and economic revival: the British Interwar Economy. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Lampe M, Sharp P (2016) Cliometric approaches to international trade. In: Diebolt C, Haupert M 
(eds) Handbook of cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, pp 295–330
Leak H (1937) Some results of the Import Duties Act. J R Stat Soc 100(4):558–606
Lehmann SH, O’Rourke KH (2011) The structure of protection and growth in the late nineteenth 
century. Rev Econ Stat 93(2):606–616
Madsen JB (2009) Trade barriers, openness, and economic growth. South Econ J 76(2):397–418
Mitchell N (2005) Public and private interests in the formulation of government policy: the case of 
the Import Duties Advisory Committee [IDAC] in 1930s Britain, London School of Economics, 
Ph.D. thesis. http://ethes es.lse.ac.uk/1829/1/U2023 98.pdf. Accessed Feb 2019
O’Rourke KH (2000) Tariffs and growth in the late 19th century. Econ J 110(463):456–483
Ravallion M (2008) Evaluating anti-poverty programs. In: Schultz TP, Strauss J (eds) Handbook of 
development economics. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Richardson HW (1967) Economic recovery in Britain, 1932–9. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London
Rodríguez F, Rodrik D (2000) Trade policy and economic growth: a sceptic’s guide to cross-national 
evidence. NBER Macroecon Annu 15:261–325
Vamvakidis A (2002) How robust is the growth-openness connection? Historical evidence. J Econ 
Growth 7(1):57–80
Williamson JG (1990) Latin American adjustment: how much has happened?. Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, Washington
Tariff Rate Classification Sources
CET (1935) Customs and Excise Tariff of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
in operation on the 1st January, 1935. Published under the authority of the Commissioners of 
His Majesty’s Customs and Excise, H.M. Stationary Office
Cmd. 5296 (1936) Twenty-seventh report of the commissioners of His Majesty’s customs and excise 
for the year ended 31st March 1936 being the 80th report relating to the customs and the 79th 
report relating to the excise. HMSO
Hutchinson HJ (1965) Tariff-making and industrial reconstruction: an account of the work of the 
Import Duties Advisory Committee 1932–39. Harrap, London
60 S. P. Lloyd, S. Solomou 
1 3
IDAC (1932a) Import duties: report by the Import Duties Advisory Committee and additional import 
duties (No. 1) Order, Import Duties Advisory Committee
IDAC (1932b) Statutory rules and orders: customs: additional import duties, No. 257, Import Duties 
Advisory Committee
NIESR (1943) Trade regulations and commercial policy of the United Kingdom. National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Disaggregated Industry Data
Board of Trade: Business Statistics Office, Census of Production: Final Report (Censuses, 1924, 1930, 
1935 and 1948). HMSO, London
Bowley AS (1944) Studies in the national income: 1924–1938. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Brown EC (1954) Industrial production in 1935 and 1948. London and Cambridge Economic Bulletin, 
December, pp v–vii
Schwartz GL, Rhodes EC, Output, employment and wages in the United Kingdom: 1924, 1930, 1935. 
London and Cambridge Economic Service, Royal Economic Society Memorandum, No. 75
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
